‘The Importance of being Civil Society’: Student Politics and the Reformist Movement in Khatami's Iran by Rivetti, Paola & Cavatorta, Francesco
1 
 
‘The importance of being civil society:’ student politics and the reformist 
movement in Khatami’s Iran.  
 
Through a non-conventional understanding of civil society activism, the article provides an 
explanation of the relationship between the student movement and Khatami’s governments in Iran. 
This study approaches ‘civil society’ as a space where we may observe the dynamics and the exercise of 
power. The case study of the interactions between the Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat and Khatami’s 
governments illustrates how civil society is not a fixed concept, but a contested one. By analysing the 
conflicts and interactions between these two actors, the article examines the continuous negotiations 
that reinvent the meaning of civil society and produce political inclusion or exclusion. 
 
Introduction  
Over the last few decades, civil society has re-gained an important place in national 
and international politics. In its mainstream liberal-democratic interpretation it has 
become a synonym of counter-power against authoritarianism, engine of fair and 
sustainable development, and mark of transparency in political processes. In this 
tradition, the concept of ‘civil society’ is also an alternative to corruption, rigidity and 
slowness of the public sector, mobilizing a sphere of society independent from the 
market and the state that would contribute to improve the workings of both. The 
political transformations in Eastern Europe and Latin America coupled with studies that 
confirmed the significant role of civil society in strengthening democratic institutions in 
established democracies generated new interest in the positive role that civil society 
supposedly plays
1
. It follows that academic studies and policy-making conceived of 
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civil society as a virtuous concept both in theory and practice. While this has been the 
dominant interpretation of civil society with all the normative consequences that this 
has, there are also other definitions of it that derive from different political traditions 
such as Marxism. In particular, Gramscian thought generated a narrative of civil society 
as a sphere of antagonism where the mainstream dominant principles of how a society 
should be governed are played out against the less central emancipatory ones. This view 
has however over time become very marginal. In any case, there is very little doubt that 
civil society activism has been for a long time equated with positive norms such as 
democracy, human rights and development.
2
 However, during the late 1990s and 
increasingly in the 2000s, a number of studies emerged questioning its positive 
contribution in challenging authoritarianism and promoting sustainable development. In 
the workings of scholars such as Tempest,
3
 Jamal,
4
 Encarnacion
5
 and Liverani
6
 civil 
society, once rid of its inherent positive normativity, can be easily co-opted and/or 
created from the top in order to strengthen authoritarian political rule and promote 
uneven development. All this is usually compounded by the observation that the use of 
this concept when transported in non-Western national political cultures might not 
work. In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the workings and impact 
of civil society on national politics, both approaches to civil society have to be 
questioned. One the one hand, there is the need to move away from the simplistic 
acceptance of civil society as counter-power to authoritarianism because there is 
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significant evidence demonstrating that in many contexts this is simply not the case.
7
 
On the other, the mere idea of civil society as an instrument of the state does not 
describe fully the reality in authoritarian regimes as the case of Eastern Europe in the 
1980s indicated.
8
 It follows that relations between the state and civil society are not 
black or white, but work themselves out in a much more complex and nuanced manner.  
Building on the necessity to go beyond the dichotomous nature of the two previous 
theoretical and practical uses of civil society, the aim of this article is to describe the 
evolution of the narrative of civil activism in Iran, through the analysis of the 
relationship between the regime and the student organization Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat 
(DTV) since its establishment in 1980 until the end of the reformist era in 2005. The 
starting point is the move away from a traditional conceptualization of civil society as a 
sphere of engagement by focusing instead on the use of its rhetoric to explain how the 
concept may offer a justification tool for activism and/or oppression. How was it used 
by the social and political actors that claimed to be “civil society actors”? Has the 
rhetoric of civil society been used to de-legitimize political competitors, for instance, or 
as a sort of bargaining chip to suit partisan interests? All this is important because the 
concept of civil society in its traditional understandings needs to be problematized if it 
is going to aptly explain why different actors with conflicting interests and objectives all 
utilize it in their practices and discourses.    
 
An innovative understanding of civil society 
Starting in the late 1980s with the democratization of Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, civil society returned to centre stage in international and national politics. 
Hailed as a major contributing factor to the collapse of authoritarianism, the actors 
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(associations and non-governmental organizations) representing civil society in its 
liberal-democratic conceptualization became both an important tool of analysis and a 
crucial pillar of democratization policies. The Polish case of Solidarnosc has become 
the intellectual point of reference of ‘liberation’ of society from an authoritarian and 
bureaucratic state through civil activism. Building on this, in 2000 Laith Kubba argued 
that civil society, understood and practiced in this manner, would bring democracy to 
the Arab world as well.
9
  
A similar trend occurred in the field of developmental economics with development 
NGOs increasingly perceived as being extremely important for the success of market 
reforms and therefore progressively associated to policy-making. The Post Washington 
Consensus Era is indeed characterized by a critical view on previous structural 
adjustments policies which did not pay sufficient attention to human needs.
10
 In this 
new view, the focus shifted from economic adjustment plans to the necessity of a 
democratic management of politics and development. The main protagonist of such a 
vision of how development should be done is ‘civil society,’ whose pars constituens, 
namely NGOs, are deemed to favor a democratic, balanced and fair development.
11
 This 
refashioning of economic developmental policies has transformed the exercise of power 
and the relationships among the actors, generating new forms of governance and new 
borders for political inclusion or exclusion.
12
 Consequently, the shift from government 
to what is termed ‘good governance’ implied a change not only in the economic realm. 
The preference for cooperative relations over top-down approaches to policy and 
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decision making became a widespread notion in the political sphere as well, collapsing 
the idea of good administration with that of participation, as a way of limiting ‘from 
below’ the exercise of power by the elites.13 Even if the definition of ‘governance’ is far 
from being consensual and precise, what is clear is that the concept is centered on the 
involvement of a growing number of actors in the definition of priorities, objectives and 
strategies states pursue. Its affirmation deeply reshaped relations among actors, and 
especially between state and non-institutional actors:
14
 civil activists in primis. 
Almost inevitably, the concept of civil society gained a strong symbolic meaning 
associated with the so-called ‘feel good terms’15 such as ‘democracy,’ ‘participation,’ 
and ‘development from below.’ Due to these normative references, civil society has 
become a sort of ‘institutional myth,’ whose meaning is highly recognized, shared and 
symbolic. These symbolic meanings are generally seen as a boundary to state 
authoritarianism and centralism, sustaining a wider and more democratic access to 
resources and information. However, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the emergence 
of a scholarly trend that attempted to counter this narrative and the feel-good terms 
associated with it. In these studies civil society became an instrument available to the 
state, whether authoritarian or democratic, to support its own vision of both political and 
economic development. Thus, states attempted and often succeeded in articulating 
through ‘civil society’ their own preferences and masked the pursuit of their objectives 
by acting ostensibly in the name of civil society even when this was blatantly not the 
case.
16
 In this approach, the emergence, for instance, of thousands of NGOs across the 
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Arab world and Iran did not demonstrate a progressive liberalization of the state, but its 
authoritarian upgrading.
17
 In this context, civil society becomes the opposite of counter-
power.   
There are two main problems with the literature on civil society and how it interacts 
with the State. First is that there is a high degree of fixity attached to the concept of civil 
society. On the one hand civil activism is perceived to be inherently good for improving 
the quality of democracy or, in authoritarian contexts, for undermining authoritarian 
structures of power. On the other, the same activism is treated as either meaningless or 
even detrimental to the success of democracy with civil society being used by 
authoritarian regimes to strengthen their grip on society. Both conceptualizations, while 
diverging widely in their assessment of civil society, do not leave any room for the 
possibility that the rhetoric of civil activism and the concept itself could shift and 
change according to time and space. Thus it could be hypothesized that the meaning and 
content of civil society vary depending on the perception and self-perception of the 
actors involved at different points in time. While in a specific historical moment, the 
label civil society is attached to a particular organization, at a different point such label 
could be withdrawn. This means that civil society is not only a normatively neutral 
category, but that the very rhetoric of it can change widely.  
The second problem is that the mainstream literature on civil society conceives of it 
as a group of actors, namely NGOs, associations and other non-state and non-market 
actors, but it might be better to think of it as a space of contestation where such actors 
operate. Civil society should be conceived not as an actor or a group of actors which 
may act, resist, dissent or collaborate, but as an arena where we can observe political 
dynamics and the exercise of power at work whereby the very definition of civil society 
is the outcome of such political struggles. This is the case of the inclusion/exclusion 
cleavage, as some actors may be eligible for the label ‘civil society’ only at a specific 
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point in time in their history. For instance, governments may indeed use that label as a 
political tool to legitimize some social or political actors or may use it as a ‘stick’ 
against those actors it wants to repress. Conversely, a social actor can self-select as 
‘civil society’ actor and claim to be part of it, depending on its relationship with the 
governmental authorities.
18
 It follows that concrete political inclusion/exclusion and 
symbolic meanings associated to ‘civil society’ are two interacting aspects because of 
the presence of external sanctioning.  
The meaning of ‘civil society’ is thus the outcome of an ongoing negotiation, and not 
simply a-historical or de-contextualized: in order to illustrate this process, the relations 
between the Iranian student organization Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat (DTV) and the 
Iranian regime are examined. The reason for this choice resides in the fact that the two 
Khatami’s reformist governments (1997-2005) often used the concept of civil society in 
conjunction with political liberalization, and, by doing so, re-shaped the meaning and 
nature of civil society itself. In fact this ‘governmental take-over’ led to unforeseen 
consequences that impacted on all actors that had the self-perception of being civil 
society, creating at the same time new areas of conflict with it. The case of DTV 
highlights how some groups that had initially enthusiastically adhered to the 
governmental ‘civil society project’ ended up moving away from Khatami’s 
governments, thus re-shaping the concept of civil society too.  
 
Civil society during the reform era 
In Iran, the rhetoric of liberal-democratic civil society entered the public debate in 
the 1990s. At the time, some intellectuals and militants (called roushanfekran-e nou, 
new intellectuals or alternative thinkers) used the concept to denounce state 
authoritarianism. The people who first employed it belonged to the generation of early 
revolutionaries and Khomeini supporters, generally excluded from power since the early 
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1990s.
19
 In 1996-1997 these former khomeinists supported Mohammad Khatami’s 
candidacy and the reformist governments (1997-2005) with their political discourse 
emphasizing civil society, political democratization and participation as antidotes to 
authoritarianism and the corruption of the original revolutionary ideals. The supremacy 
of the people’s will against the mismanagement of power by the rahbar (the Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei) and the Council of Guardians was the core of their 
thinking. Criticizing their own past, these former khomeinists – now turned reformists – 
denounced the transformation of revolutionary ideals into the defense of privileges 
acquired by certain social groups since the revolution
20
 and worked to change that. It 
follows that the rhetoric of civil society was given the role of counter-power intended to 
reflect an antithesis between separate entities: state and society. This is the case of 
intellectuals such as Majid Mohammadi or Alireza Alavitabar, for instance, who 
outlined a ‘confrontational’ interpretation of civil society, whose growth is conceived in 
opposition to state apparatus and as a form of protection from it.
21
 The scholar 
Hooshang Amirahmadi proposes a similar definition as well, stating that  
 
[c]ivil society thus can be defined as the sphere of social discourses, trends, and 
autonomous social movements that attempt to regulate society. The goal of such activities 
is to bolster citizens' capabilities and protect them from the arbitrary exercise of power by 
the state or any other organized group. While civil society is a political concept, it must 
be distinguished from the political sphere where actors are preoccupied with access to, or 
the exercise of, power.
22
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Another author who adheres to this perspective is the well-known dissident Akbar 
Ganji, who defends the separation between state and civil society as a milestone of 
freedom and democracy.
23
 
After Mohammad Khatami’s electoral victory in 1997, these supporters of this 
particular rhetoric of civil society re-entered the political scene as members of the 
government and Parliament, or as intellectuals, scholars, and journalists. From these 
new positions of relative power, they became the promoters of an embedded and 
collaborative project of ‘civil society,’ which was asked to support the government’s 
activities and to converge on its political programme.
24
 Khatami himself asked all the 
actors that he identified as civil society such as professional associations, students’ 
organizations, trade unions, charitable associations, media, researchers, scholars and 
experts to supervise his mandate and work, and to voice their demands. Khatami also 
stated very clearly that involving experts drawn from civil society in policy-making was 
an advantage for the government allowing it to discharge its duties more effectively.
25
 
In sum, Khatami’s view of civil society coincided with its liberal-democratic 
interpretation and the rhetoric of it had positive connotations linked to the feel good 
terms. By asking civil society to participate to governance under the tutelage of the 
government however, Khatami began to modify the nature and meaning of civil society. 
If during the early 1990s the debate on civil society was confined to a counter-power 
discourse, during Khatami’s government it shifted to the point that the rhetoric of civil 
society as counter-power was far from dominant because now most of its promoters 
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actually occupied positions of power, often in institutional roles. Generally speaking, 
many of them ended up embodying both the state and what they argued was the 
alternative to the state.
26
 This situation led to numerous cases of governmental 
cooptation of ‘civil society organizations.’ In terms of NGOs, many of them survived 
economically and politically thanks to their proximity to the government, obtaining 
benefits but, at the same time, suffering pressure and conditioning from it. The 
increasing overlap between activism and government’s policies led to the intrusion of 
the latter in the former. For instance, Ziba Jalali-Naini, member of the governmental 
office that coordinated NGOs, asserted that non-governmental organizations didn’t 
prove themselves to be the proper instrument to satisfy the needs of Iranian women. 
This is because of their links and their dependence from the central government, 
whereby NGOs tried to flatten the needs of citizens on the vision and the goals of the 
executive.
27
 Once the rhetoric of civil society becomes highly institutionalized and 
increases its consensus among actors, it ceases to be an exclusive instrument for 
counter-power. The result sometimes is that the same rhetoric that once celebrated civil 
society as counter-power becomes now the instrument through which the state 
legitimates its own power. By taking possession of the rhetoric on civil society, 
Mohammad Khatami’s governments asserted to represent it, and declared the will to 
empower it; this significantly diminished the potential of civil society’s rhetoric as 
alternative and opposition. 
What is also interesting to note is that the shifting of the borders between power and 
counter-power, and between inclusion and exclusion in political processes does not 
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entail a complete disappearance of civil society’s role as an antagonist to ‘power from 
above.’ More precisely, the model of civil society determined by the passage from 
government to governance creates new conflicts and cleavages. Thus, while the 
opposition between state and civil society may disappear from the official discourse of 
the actors, it can re-emerge in different spheres, taking place in more informal political 
settings. There are unintended consequences to the collapsing of civil activism with 
governmental activities.  
 
The rhetoric of ‘civil society’ meets student politics 
The relation between the Khatami’s administrations and the main student umbrella 
organization in Iran, Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat-e Howze va Daneshgah (the office for 
the consolidation of the unity between universities and religious schools - DTV) offers 
an example of how conflicts and cleavages move and shift without disappearing while 
the concept of civil society is constantly reshaped. 
DTV was established after the revolution as a tool to Islamize universities and 
oppose Marxists and liberals on campuses. One of the founders stated: ‘we received the 
order to establish the DTV directly from Khomeini.’28 Student politics has historically 
been important to educate and select the political élite of the Islamic Republic, in 
particular for the Islamic left and the radical conservatives. Among the former students’ 
leaders, we find Abbas Abdi, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Ebrahim Ashgarzadeh, Mohammad 
Musavi-Khoeiniha, Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh, Ali Larijiani and Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad.
29
 Historically, DTV was the only student organization present in Iran 
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until early 1990s, clearly illustrating the revolutionary authorities’ effort to create a 
politically homogeneous university population. Anti-imperialism, radical critique of 
materialism and a strong faith in Khomeini’s religious and political leadership 
characterized the ideological position of DTV. The historical context contributed 
significantly to its leading position in universities, as Iran was engaged in a long war 
with Iraq and the Islamic Republic was struggling for its own survival: the need for 
unity was strong in all sectors of Iranian society. While all strands of Islamism were 
present within DTV, the dominant stream was the Islamic left which fed into DTV its 
anti-imperialist and redistributive creeds.   
After the end of the war and Khomeini’s death, the Rafsanjani’s administration and 
Khamenei’s leadership removed the Islamic left from power. As the latter was 
particularly active in universities through DTV, Rafsanjani promoted the establishment 
of another student group in order to create an alternative ideological hegemony: the 
anjoman-e islami daneshju-ye bassiji (the Islamic association of the bassij student), 
whose leader was Heshmatollah Tabarzadi.
30
  
The effort to challenge the ideological hegemony of the Islamic left within 
universities corresponded to the dismissal of leftists from important political posts with 
the new rahbar, Ali Khamenei, removing the main political figures heading a number of 
institutional or semi-institutional structures.
31
 Such a condition of growing marginality 
pushed the Islamic left to introduce a political discourse based on the idea of a more 
democratic access to politics and a critique of the authoritarian exercise of power. This 
change of political discourse and ideological reference was in part a sincere change of 
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mind and in part due to the necessity of political survival given their progressive 
marginalization.
32
 Many of the dismissed figures re-entered the universities as 
professors and researchers, founded think-tanks or edited publications, and had very 
strong relations with the students of DTV. The most famous examples are Abdolkarim 
Soroush, Akbar Ganji, Abbas Abdi, Mohammad Khatami, and Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, 
who were involved in the establishment and growth of DTV.
33
 They wrote books on the 
social and intellectual transformations of Iran and reflected on their past political 
experiences, adopting a more liberal perspective, and were engaged in the description of 
a ‘changing society.’34 The cultural and scientific production on the issue of civil 
society increased significantly in the second half of the 1990s and it was mainly 
produced by these former radicals, who became a sort of ‘primary meaning makers,’ 
that is those who establish the epistemological platform which makes sense of 
expressions and words. Thus, the Islamic left ended up speaking the language of rights 
and of democratic access to politics, becoming the first interpreter of a renewed 
discourse on democracy as freedom for independent actors. This was subsumed under 
the label of civil society working to limit state power. 
Two important factors contributed to the challenge that DTV had to deal with in 
universities. First of all, according to a leading member of DTV, in late 1992, one of 
Rafsanjani’s closest collaborators, Said Hajjarian promoted a plan of civil security 
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elected President of the Republic. 
34
 As the title of one of Abbas Abdi’s books shows: A. Abdi, M. Godarzi (eds.), Tahavvolat-e Farhangi 
dar Iran (Cultural transformation in Iran), (Teheran: Ravesh, 1999). 
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(amnyat-e madani) which established Niruha-ye moqavamat-e bassij units within 
university campuses to challenge the influence of DTV
35
 because across the universities 
DTV was very active against key Rafsanjani’s policies.36 The most important 
consequence of the civil security plan was that universities became heterogeneous 
places, where people with different ideological orientations met and struggled for 
hegemony. With the entrance of the bassij units in universities, the function of DTV 
changed. Second, in 1993 the electoral procedures of DTV was amended, allowing all 
students to cast their votes in the election and to run as candidates whereas previously 
only the ones who had gone through a screening process carried out by DTV itself could 
participate and be elected to the central committee. As one student put it, ‘[DTV] 
became a free harbor for any kind of activist.’37 Until that moment, the political culture 
of DTV (and of the Islamic left in general) was deeply rooted in the revolutionary 
mobilization – just like bassij militias - but the continuous contacts between DTV and 
bassiji student units and the turnover of the organization’s leaders meant that DTV 
quickly moved away from such political framework.  
DTV maintained good relations with the Islamic left, opposing both Rafsanjani’s 
government because of its liberal policies, which were considered dangerous for social 
cohesion and national independence
38
 and the bassij units considered to be the longa 
manu of the conservatives and thus co-responsible of the marginalization of the Islamic 
left. The link with the Islamic left was so strong that  
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[DTV] had no independent political position, it was a sort of transmission belt between 
the intellectuals, the Islamic left and young people… for this reason, when the 
intellectuals started to advocate the need to develop civil society, DTV adopted that 
slogan too. There was no independent political evaluation on that.
39
  
 
In addition, DTV had kept the ideologues of the 1980s as its point of reference even 
if they were much older than students,
40
 highlighting how heavily the organization 
depended from the discourse emanating from the Islamic left. Since Mohammad 
Khatami’s electoral campaign in 1996-1997 was based principally on the concepts that 
the Islamic left had begun to endorse, Khatami was enthusiastically embraced by the 
students through DTV. In December 1997, few months after his election, Khatami met 
the students and members of DTV. On that occasion, the students showed appreciation 
for Khatami and his reform plan.
41
 In some ways, the government had to engage civil 
society actors such as the students’ organization to foster its legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of its political discourse – based on the very idea of strengthening civil 
society. Thus students were called to participate, to get involved and to collaborate with 
the government.
42
 
DTV and the Khatami’s administrations seemed to have a perfect coincidence of 
objectives and practices. Conflicts seemed non-existent and there were no signs of 
opposition to the point that DTV entered the political coalition supporting Khatami’s 
election, the ‘2nd of Khordad Front’.43 The rhetoric of civil society that had entered Iran 
as counter-power was progressively taken on board by sectors of the political 
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establishment and with Khatami’s election it became official discourse, illustrating how 
a counter-hegemonic concept was over time transformed into a discourse that an 
authoritarian state can legitimately hold, as one should not forget that despite Khatami’s 
electoral victories, Iran remained an authoritarian state and Khatami himself had no 
intention of abandoning the original revolutionary framework.    
 
In occasion of 2
nd
 of khordad election [the 1997 presidential election], the anjoman-ha 
islami [the Islamic associations in universities which elect the central office of DTV] 
became the electoral headquarters of Khatami’s campaign. Such an important role given 
to students caused a powerful expansion of student activism: many more got involved and 
we had a general feeling to be protected and on the right side of history. We felt strong. 
Until the events of 18 tir [the July 1999 student protests], the DTV recognized Khatami’s 
leadership. […] after those events, everything changed44.  
 
The July 1999 events brought conflict between state and society back on the agenda 
of DTV.  
 
From cooperation to conflict: civil society “strikes back” 
In July 1999, the students protested against the closing of the reformist newspaper 
Salam, and were violently repressed by the police and pro-Khamenei militias. The riots 
continued for some days, and deaths among the demonstrators were reported.
45
 This 
event marked a turning point for the students, as Khatami did not come to their aid. On 
the contrary, the government called on the students and DTV to moderate their 
discourse, expressing an ambiguous condemnation of the violent repression enacted by 
the Ministry of Information and by the revolutionary guards. The students felt 
abandoned by the reformist government they were supporting, and started to look more 
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and more critically at their membership into the 2
nd
 of Khordad Front, even though they 
still remained loyal to Khatami in the parliamentary elections of 2000.  
After the 1999 event, DTV began to question the validity of Khatami’s political 
programme and started thinking about the potential for reform in Iran outside the 
institutional arena because of the unsatisfactory answers that Khatami‘s reformism was 
providing. The students became determined to be a sort of ‘watchdog’ and counter-
power for the government,
46
 as the latter was deemed unable to design a path to 
democracy for Iran. A disengagement from Khatami was by now on the cards. These 
ideas were embodied in the theory of the gozar az Khatami (overtaking Khatami), 
which was presented at the 2000 DTV Annual Meeting in the city of Gorgan.
47
 This 
stance became widely shared among the students: a majority of them indeed wanted 
DTV and the jonbesh-e daneshjuy (the student movement) to be independent from 
institutional politics and to act as an independent social movement. This was the 
position of the so called Allameh majority faction:
48
  
 
[our] faction supports the process of democratization through civil society, not through 
elections […] we are part of the civil society and today we are united in supporting social 
movements before politics and institutions [for this reason] we have established different 
commissions which work on sensitive issues such as women and minorities’ rights […] in 
contact with social movements.
 49
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From then, conflicts emerged both in the public political discourse and in the 
political processes between government and the majority of students. Eventually, in 
2003 DTV abandoned the 2
nd
 of Khordad Front and did not back reformist candidates in 
the municipal elections; since then, internal voices calling for electoral boycott have 
become more and more powerful. The emergence of such conflict is due to the fact that 
students felt unappreciated for their efforts and contribution to Khatami’s victories. In 
addition, many began to question the ‘politics of active calm,’ a theory elaborated in 
Khatami’s circles on the need for patience and unconditional support for the 
government from ‘civil society.’ According to the reformists in power, the goal of 
DTV’s activities was to assist the governmental implementation of reforms and to 
respect the theory of ‘two steps forward, one step back.’50 In particular there was the 
sentiment that students should not be too ‘enthusiastic’ in fighting for a democratic 
change that other sectors of the ruling elites did not even wish to contemplate. Contrary 
to the students, who advocated the need for action and even rupture with the anti-reform 
elements of the system of the Islamic republic, the government had to be mindful of the 
sustainability of the system as a whole, which it wanted to transform slowly and not 
abruptly for fear of a conservative backlash. This sense of duty towards the system is 
present in interviews with politicians, and it can be labeled a ‘call for responsibility.’ A 
common sentiment is that ‘Khatami had no choice:’  
 
Khatami had projected a civil society on his mind, which did not become a reality. Civil 
society meant parties, trade unions, and a free press. Khatami did not create such things, 
and at the end he found himself alone against a strong structure of power. Those who 
don’t enjoy power are always oppressed, and thus Khatami started to step back. If he had 
social power and support, he would have resisted against the conservatives, but you 
know… if one day he said something, the day after he had to deny it for his own sake. In 
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2002 he sent two important laws to Parliament [these had the goal to foster Khatami’s 
power at the expenses of the Council of Guardians, an un-elected body of supervision], 
and said: this is my red line! I won’t accept you reject them! But the Council of 
Guardians did it, the Guardians rejected the laws. So, what should he do? Nothing. He 
had to remain in his place till the end of the mandate, and work within the legal 
framework of the regime. He had no choice.
51
 
 
Similar reflections often bring to the conclusion that ‘it is easy to play radical politics 
if you don’t have to manage a country:’  
 
I have always thought that the student movement had to remain close to a political group. 
But the students decided to leave the institutional stage of politics. They said they worked 
for democracy, but they didn’t help a democratic popular awareness.52  
 
Moreover, the reformists had a long and successful political history, as most of them 
took part in the revolution and held important political post during the 1980s. They felt 
legitimated in approaching the students as ‘noble fathers’ because of this history. Above 
all, many among the reformist elite had been student leaders and were directly engaged 
in the foundation of DTV just after the revolution.
53
 Even years later, they kept a strong 
link with the DTV and its leadership. The reformists kept leading important student 
celebrations and to be seen as a sort of historical leaders by the students, even if years 
had passed. In such a situation, the personal linkages often assumed great importance, 
even influencing the political credibility of actors. These prominent reformists felt that 
the students should trust their commitment and political outlook based on patience, but 
the majority of students over time refused to accept it. 
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Given the outlook reformists had on how to best proceed to reform the Iranian 
political system, it is not surprising that many students often complained about the 
government keeping them in a condition of dependence and intellectual infancy. A 
shared comment among them was that ‘we are more than arms to distribute flyers, 
contrary to the government’s opinion,’ as one said.54 DTV criticized the reformist 
political class as too moderate and compromised and students accused Khatami and his 
government to be too soft in opposing the conservatives. The reformist political élite 
was perceived to be too embedded in the institutional politics of an authoritarian regime 
and they felt that ‘Khatami and his allies can’t reform the Islamic Republic: they are the 
Islamic Republic, how could they be willing to change the system of power which 
allows them to be in charge?’55  
A return to civil society as counter-power took place and was embedded in the 
‘global mythology’ that students naturally are the ‘democratic consciousness of 
society,’ a sort of natural vanguard for the awakening and political awareness of 
societies. The received wisdom is that students must criticize the government and its 
institutions, and call for democracy to demonstrate that they are intellectually engaged 
and alive. This idea is promoted not only by Iranian militant students, but also by 
scholars and sociologists, who emphasize it in the case of non-Western countries.
56
 
Thus, students have acted according to this (self)-representation: as vanguard of change, 
progress and democracy. The students and DTV criticized the government for not doing 
enough to establish a democratic government in Iran. They acted following their 
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supposed nature; that is mobilizing and criticizing the established and institutional 
power. In the words of one of them: 
 
Political parties have been tried to infiltrate the student movement [...] This has been an 
obstacle. Reform parties have always wanted the student movement to be following them 
so that they would devise the strategy for the students. But the student movement 
gradually became independent [...] distancing itself from power. So today it is in a 
completely different position, which is closer to its natural point and where it should be. 
[...] Now that it is separated from power (i.e. the regime) and does not participate in 
elections, it must have a new strategy.
57
  
 
Thus, the interpretation of civil society the students put forth as a result of their 
frustration with Khatami’s reformists linked back to its original meaning. But this is not 
simply a return to what was imported into Iran a decade before. Indeed, this last 
meaning of “civil society” is the outcome of an ongoing process of reinvention of the 
concept through the political struggle between DTV and Khatami’s government. Both 
have forged a new meaning for ‘civil society’ according to their political priorities. 
Before 1999, being a ‘civil society actor’ entailed a relationship with the governmental 
authority, namely a collaborative attitude in the name of shared objectives that made 
Iran, paradoxically, a model of good governance with state and society closely 
cooperating for the common good. After that date, ‘civil society membership’ implied a 
more conflictual relationship. For example, in 2003, a new round of student protests 
was organized to oppose a plan of tuition hikes for some university services. The 
reaction of governmental representatives was harsh. Mehdi Karubi declared that ‘Iran is 
united in the rejection of foreign pressure’ and called on families to prevent their 
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children from taking part in the protests and ‘being tricked by some people abroad.’58 
Abdolvahed Mussavi-Lari, Interior Minister and leading member of the League of 
Militant Clerics – the Islamic leftist political group- accused the students of being 
‘hooligans’ and holding ‘illegal gatherings.’59 These declarations by reformist leaders 
were not dissimilar to the Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi’s, a conservative, who 
declared that the riots were ‘organized by foreign medias and satellite channels.’60 They 
all accused the students to be foreign agents, or to be manipulated by foreigners. Such 
public accusations had the explicit goal of delegitimizing the DTV and its political 
activism. Paradoxically, those events were used by Khatami and Hamid Reza Asefi, the 
Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, as evidence that the regime was democratic. The 
possibility students enjoyed of organizing protests, according to Khatami, was the proof 
that they were treated democratically, and could protest in order to make their demands, 
as it happens in a democratic country, as Asefi also underlined.
61
 Although they have 
been identified as a national threat by some reformists, the students and their activism 
were used as some sort of ‘insurance’ by Khatami to prove his government democratic 
and liberal enough to allow a degree of political contestation.  
This turn of events demonstrates that civil society membership does not change per 
se, but depends on the type of sanctioning, whether positive or negative, it receives from 
other actors playing the game. In the case of Iran, Khatami and the reformists ditched 
the students when they began to voice their criticism of the government they used to 
support and labeled them ‘hooligans’ and therefore outside the bounds of civil society. 
As a prominent reformist politician put it, students were ‘swept away as grain of sand, 
no longer protected by the desert.’62 On their part, students claimed they had returned to 
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fulfill the genuine role of a civil society actor while the government had betrayed the 
very reason why they had encouraged and engaged with civil society in the first place.    
 
Conclusion  
For a considerable amount of time, civil society activism was considered a necessary 
ingredient for the consolidation of democracy and for the undermining of authoritarian 
political systems. The problematisation of the concept of civil society away from the 
dominant liberal-democratic conception of it is certainly a welcome development, but it 
does not end discussions about the role and nature of civil society. In fact, even those 
who argue that civil society activism might strengthen authoritarian rule and reinforce 
patterns of underdevelopment usually call for the creation of a ‘genuine, true civil 
society.’63 This study goes beyond discussions relating to the ‘real’ nature of civil 
society and focuses on the rhetoric of civil society in which the label that different 
political actors use in order to achieve their political objectives shifts in time and space. 
The case-study of the relations between DTV and Khatami’s government shows indeed 
that in different historical contexts, the same actors have used a cultural instrument such 
as “civil society” in opposite ways: as counter-power and as an ally of governmental 
institutions.  
This contribution offers a picture of civil society as a space where we observe some 
complex phenomena such as the reinvention of meaning of a shared concept and the 
development of legitimacy patterns, which engender new conflicts and new room for 
political action. Indeed, the dominant rhetoric has concrete effects on political 
processes. The hegemonic culture is not merely ‘the discourse spoken by the power,’64 
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yet it is something which may determine the legitimacy of actors’ demands or 
undermine it. This is evident in the case of DTV when it refused to conform to the way 
‘civil society’ should act according to the government. This exclusion is a warning for 
other organizations too in so far as they have to conform and accept the model of 
integration between state and civil society-, even if it means abandoning the role of 
counter-power. However, this process of ‘taming civil society’ through governance 
finds powerful limits because the consensus between civil society and the state, as 
occurred in the early years of Khatami, can also generated new conflicts. In the case of 
DTV, the limit was the self-representation of students. Political and social actors have a 
very specific tradition and tend to act according to it. It follows that students generally 
are represented as critics of institutional power and believe themselves to be the 
‘democratic counsciousness’ of society. This means that they keep on acting according 
to that self-representation. State institutions generally have a tradition in conflict 
management, compromise and government, and thus act according to these self- 
representations. Khatami’s governments have done precisely this.  
If we use the spatial metaphor of civil society as an arena where we observe political 
phenomena, we also see that actors can enter or leave such a space. For instance, we 
have seen that the students were considered civil society actors under specific political 
conditions, while later they were deprived of such a label. Rhetoric and related concrete 
dynamics of power create labels for selected actors, which satisfy precise criteria. In this 
sense civil society looks like a culturally defined space, whose membership is defined 
through both the actors’ features and their relation with power. This defines the very 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
concept of civil society through a distribution of ‘civil society memberships,’ which 
allows the entrance in the realm of civil society to those actors who accept the 
governance and the collaborative model of state-civil society relation. In this sense, the 
very concept of civil society makes boundaries and conflicts shift, engendering new 
spaces for political confrontation among some selected actors, re-fashioning both the 
idea of civil society as resistant to the central power and the image of civil society as a 
co-opted collaborator. 
 
 
 
 
